Wednesday November 19, 2025
Fulcrum —
Globally, the clean energy transition has unleashed a scramble for rare earth elements — crucial materials used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, solar panels, and batteries. However, this race for “green” minerals exposes a deeper problem: cross-border accountability is nearly impossible when extraction is driven by non-state actors tied to major powers such as China. Operating in governance vacuums, these actors lie beyond the reach of law yet within the reach of markets.
As demand for rare earths is expected to triple by 2030, the supply chain remains opaque, and consumers in Europe and North America are unaware that their well-intentioned “green” technologies are entangled with toxic waste and unregulated mining in conflict zones, such as Myanmar’s Shan and Kachin States. There is a need for coordinated action — particularly between Thailand and Myanmar, working with major powers such as China and the US — to address the problem.
China, which accounts for over 40 per cent of global renewable energy capacity, drives and dominates this supply chain. It handles 90 per cent of global rare earth processing capacity but has increasingly outsourced extraction to weaker neighbours such as Myanmar. In 2024, Myanmar supplied 57 per cent of China’s rare earth imports. In the country, oversight is minimal and enforcement is near impossible. Having already suffered the environmental toll of rare earth mining at home, Beijing has effectively externalised pollution risks beyond its borders — creating a cross-border environmental crisis where non-state proxies do what the state cannot be seen to do.
There is an unregulated rare earth boom in Myanmar’s Shan State, concentrated in the territories controlled by the powerful, self-governing United Wa State Army (UWSA). This has poisoned waterways flowing into northern Thailand. The Kok River, a tributary of the Mekong River, was once crucial for local economies and ecosystems. Today, the river is tainted with arsenic, causing skin blisters among residents and deformities in local fish. The Thai government has launched monitoring and mitigation measures. However, civil society groups argue these steps address the symptoms but not the causes of the problem. The extraction in Myanmar occurs beyond any enforceable liability regime, with the number of mines expanding from three in 2005 to 26 in 2025 in Shan State.
In August 2025, Thailand and Myanmar agreed to establish a joint technical panel to tackle arsenic contamination through dialogue and data sharing. However, the initiative highlights the futility of state-to-state diplomacy when pollution originates from zones beyond state control. Myanmar’s junta exerts little control over the UWSA, leaving Naypyitaw with scant leverage. Meanwhile, Thailand’s legal options — such as seeking an injunction at the International Court of Justice — would be unenforceable in practice. The only viable path for Thailand may lie in leveraging China’s influence on UWSA.
If the environmental costs of the green transition are allowed to fall disproportionately on politically weak and ecologically sensitive regions, the transition to clean energy will lose legitimacy.
UWSA governs enclaves, with one bordering China and another along the Thai-Myanmar border that relies on China for trade and banking access. In effect, UWSA is providing agricultural products and rare earth minerals to China in return for security. UWSA also depends on economic lifelines from China. For instance, it depends on China for essential supplies of food, medicines and fuel. This enables Beijing to influence outcomes while maintaining plausible deniability, blurring the line between state and non-state responsibility. If Thailand wants to exert pressure on UWSA and govern unregulated mining, it needs to “borrow” China’s influence.
China’s role looms large in this accountability gap. As the principal consumer and processor of rare earths, it possesses the capacity and moral responsibility to impose environmental safeguards along the supply chain. However, Beijing has little incentive to join a dialogue with Thailand and Myanmar when the current arrangement serves its economic and strategic interests. By relying on local militias and private intermediaries, China benefits from the supply of rare earths without bearing responsibility.
That equation, however, is beginning to shift, as the US has entered the regional rare earth race through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Thailand to cooperate on rare earth supply chains. This move signals that the region’s rare earth future will not be shaped solely by Beijing. The MOU will give Thailand leverage, positioning Bangkok not as a victim of river contamination but as an emerging actor in supply chain politics.
For China, this expanding competition raises the cost of inaction. Importantly, the MOU grants the US the first opportunity to invest (but not have exclusive access) in rare earth supply chains under Thai law. This gives Thailand room for manoeuvre. If Beijing continues externalising environmental harm through non-state proxies, it risks losing another major rare earth supplier with unexplored potential and regional goodwill. This will turn China’s accountability from a moral imperative into a strategic necessity.
For Thailand, the crisis reveals a deeper structural vulnerability. However, its new MOU with the US gives Bangkok a narrow window to redefine the terms of engagement. Thailand could use its role in the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism and cooperation with Washington to reframe the Kok River contamination as part of larger discussions on river basin governance and environmental security. Such an approach would also pressure China to address governance deficits created by its industrial rise.
The Kok River stands as a warning. If the environmental costs of the green transition are allowed to fall disproportionately on politically weak and ecologically sensitive regions, the transition to clean energy will lose legitimacy.
For Thailand and its neighbours, the challenge is not just cleaning up a contaminated river. How Thailand plays its cards will determine whether neighbouring countries remain victims of pollution or turn their position into leverage for a more accountable rare earth supply chain within a system where non-state extractors profit from global demand while evading oversight.